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BOLDLY INTO THE FOG: LIMITING RIGHTS OF
RECOVERY FOR INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS
Randy J. Cox* and Cynthia H. Shott**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines emotional distress damages and their
treatment by Montana courts. To guide future cases, particularly
in the burgeoning area of toxic torts and attendant claims for fear
of future disease, it is necessary to understand the concerns ex-
pressed by courts and commentators regarding emotional distress
damages and to develop a consistent approach that will allow fair
treatment of emotional, distress claims while guarding against un-
limited and disproportionate liability.
II. THE TREATMENT OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS IN
MONTANA: AN OVERVIEW
Montana courts have been called upon to consider claims of
emotional distress as both an element of damages and as a cause of
action.' The Montana Supreme Court's treatment of emotional
distress claims generally comports with established principles.' Be-
cause of some missteps, however, and because the Montana Su-
preme Court has not yet considered certain issues, Montana law is
not prepared to address difficult issues that will arise in future
cases. This article is intended to provide assistance to trial lawyers
and the courts as they confront those issues. We turn first to a
consideration of established principles.
* Partner, Boone, Karlberg & Haddon, Missoula, Montana. J.D., Northeastern Univer-
sity School of Law, 1979; B.A. Montana State University, 1975.
** Partner, Cederberg & Shott, Missoula, Montana; J.D., University of Montana, 1990.
1. Emotional distress in Montana "remains primarily an element of damages rather
than a distinct cause of action." Day v. Montana Power Co., 242 Mont. 195, 198, 789 P.2d
1224, 1226 (1990), quoting Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc., 233 Mont. 113, 123, 760 P.2d
57, 63 (1988). However, the Montana Supreme Court has also recognized and established an
independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Versland v. Caron
Transp., 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583 (1983). The Montana Supreme Court has discussed
the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress but has yet to rule that a
particular case possesses all the necessary elements to satisfy a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 246 Mont. 26, 803 P.2d 614
(1990); see also McNeil v. Currie, - Mont. -. , 830 P.2d 1241 (1992).
2. See Part I, Section C, infra..
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A. Historical Background
History shows the reluctance of courts to accept emotional dis-
tress as an element of damages, much less as an independent cause
of action.' Courts and legal scholars give various reasons for this
reluctance to accept as compensable an interest in one's peace of
mind.4 The primary reasons include the difficulty of proving emo-
tional distress,' the potential for fraudulent claims, 6 the imposition
of "incalculable and potentially unlimited damages' 7 and a con-
cern that allowing recovery for mere fright or emotional distress
would result in a flood of litigation.' Each of these concerns point,
in one way or another, to the fundamental problems of determin-
ing the genuineness of emotional distress claims and the potential
for such claims to overwhelm an already overburdened tort
system.9
Traditionally, emotional distress damages are difficult to
prove.' 0 Mental distress is regarded as "metaphysical," and "too
subtle and speculative to be capable of [measurement] by any
standard known to the law."" Mental consequences are "evanes-
cent, intangible, and peculiar, and vary to such an extent with the
individual concerned, that they cannot be anticipated, and so lie
outside the boundaries of any reasonable 'proximate' connection
with the act of the defendant.' 12
Additionally, emotional distress is an area wrought with the
3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54-55
(5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER).
4. Id. at 55. See also Francis X. Clinch & Jodie L. Johnson, Note, Compensation of
Emotional Distress in Montana. Distinctions Between Bystanders and Direct Victims, 47
MONT. L. REV. 479 (1986).
5. STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 16:1, at 937 (1987)
(hereinafter SPEISER).
6. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 12, at 56; SPEISER, supra note 5, at 937; Douglas B. Mar-
lowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A Jurisdictional Survey of Ex-
isting Limitation Devices and Proposal Based On An Analysis of Objective Versus Subjec-
tive Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REV. 781, 784 (1988), (hereinafter Marlowe); Payton v.
Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (Mass. 1982); Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 723 F.
Supp. 1073, 1090 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
7. Kraus, 723 F. Supp. at 1090.
8. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986); Kraus, 723 F. Supp. at 1090;
Marlowe, supra note 6, at 784.
9. Cf., Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 179, where the court stated that the "underlying policy
in most jurisdictions seems to be that of compensating plaintiffs with clearly recognizable
serious injuries, while not burdening either the judicial system or individual defendants with
the latter type of claim."
10. Id.
11. SPEISER, supra note 5, at 937; see also PROSSER, supra note 3, at 55.
12. SPEISER, supra note 5, at 937.
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potential for fictitious claims.1 3 The courts express concern that if
litigants are allowed compensation for emotional distress, the
floodgates will open for litigation "in the field of trivialities and
mere bad manners. ''14
While these concerns have been, to one degree or another, dis-
credited, 5 they still run through the case law and are often cited
as reasons for not expanding defendants' liability for emotional
harm." The concerns remain valid and are worth considering in
every case. Indeed, the often-stated worries regarding genuineness
and the effect of trivial claims have been addressed, though not in
detail, in Montana.
1 7
This article concentrates primarily on the issue of emotional
distress claims in cases of minor physical injury or no physical in-
jury at all. As background, however, it is necessary to provide an
overview of Montana law and law in other jurisdictions regarding
treatment of claims based on mental suffering, distress and
anguish.
B. Montana: Emotional Distress as an Element of Damages
Some definition of the term "emotional distress" is in order.
As used in this article, "emotional distress" includes numerous de-
scriptions of psychic injury or ephemeral reactions to unpleasant
events. The term emotional distress encompasses mental anguish,
discomfort, fear, anxiety, fright, shock, humiliation, embarrass-
ment and shame. 8
The Montana Supreme Court has addressed emotional dis-
tress damages in a variety of circumstances. Where emotional dis-
tress damages flow from the negligent act itself and where signifi-
cant other damages are present, Montana courts accept emotional
distress claims as a matter of course.'9 For example, in negligence
13. Id.; see also Kraus, 723 F. Supp. at 1090.
14. SPEISER, supra note 5, at 937; PROSSER, supra note 3, at 56.
15. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 56.
16. Kraus, 723 F. Supp. at 1090. In that case, plaintiff's alleged emotional harm
stemmed from what amounted to stressful working conditions. The federal district court, in
a very thorough analysis, rejected the claims under the Federal Employees Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
17. See First Bank (N.A.) - Billings v. Clark, 236 Mont. 195, 204-08, 771 P.2d 84, 90-92
(1989). In Clark, the Montana court examined the "severe" emotional distress requirement
stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965). Id. at 206, 771 P.2d at 91.
See generally Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) addressing concerns of unlimited
liability "out of all proportion to the degree of the defendant's negligence .... Id. at 826.
18. See Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc., 211 Mont. 465, 471, 686 P.2d 209, 212
(1984); Graveley v. Springer, 145 Mont. 486, 402 P.2d 41 (1965).
19. Anderson v. TW Corp., 228 Mont. 1, 7, 741 P.2d 397, 400 (1987). This is a concept
1992]
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cases involving serious physical injury, juries are routinely allowed
to consider evidence of emotional distress and to award compensa-
tion.20 Likewise, the Montana Supreme Court has allowed plain-
tiffs to recover for their emotional distress as an element of dam-
ages in actions for (1) private nuisance,21 (2) violation of certain
constitutional rights,22 (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing,23 and (4) fraud. 4
The Montana Supreme Court has also affirmed damage
awards for emotional distress in cases of minor physical injury or
when the emotional distress is so severe that it results in some
physical manifestation.25 Evidence of sleeplessness, chest pains,
worry and damage to a relationship were enough to place the issue
of emotional distress before the jury in Zugg v. Ramage.2 6 In that
case, the court noted that "the amount of evidence of emotional
distress is close to the line. '27
Limiting emotional distress damages to cases of physical in-
jury or to cases where serious mental distress leads to physical
harm satisfies concerns regarding genuineness, difficulty of proof,
fear of fictitious claims and liability disproportionate to the con-
duct of the defendant. The mental anguish in such cases is easy to
see, prove and understand.
Claims for purely emotional injury, however, are difficult for
all courts, including Montana's. The clearest Montana example of
such difficulties is Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc.,2" which set
forth a "standard" that has adversely affected Montana jurispru-
dence. Johnson marked the Montana court's willingness to com-
with deep roots in the law. See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in
the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936). See also Clinch, et al., supra note 4, at 480-
83.
20. Graveley, at 490, 402 P.2d at 43 (1965); see also Montana Pattern Instruction No.
25.01.
21. French v. Ralph E. Moore, Inc., 203 Mont. 327, 661 P.2d 844 (1983).
22. Stensvad v. Towe, 232 Mont. 378, 759 P.2d 138 (1988).
23. See Day v. Montana Power Co., 242 Mont. 195, 789 P.2d 1224 (1990); Dunfee v.
Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 221 Mont. 447, 720 P.2d 1148 (1986); Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co.,
210 Mont. 267, 682 P.2d 725 (1984); see also Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks
& Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1349 (D. Mont. 1991).
Recoverability of tort damages in breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cases outside the insurance area is now seriously in doubt and strictly limited. See infra
note 32.
24. Zugg v. Ramage, 239 Mont. 292, 779 P.2d 913 (1989).
25. Id. at 292, 779 P.2d at 913; Niles v. Big Sky Eyewear, 236 Mont. 455, 771 P.2d 114
(1989); French, at 327, 661 P.2d at 844; Harrington v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 176 Mont. 37,
575 P.2d 578 (1978).
26. Zugg, at 298, 779 P.2d at 917.
27. Id.
28. 211 Mont. 465, 686 P.2d 209 (1984).
[Vol. 53
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pensate tort victims for purely emotional disturbance in cases in
which the defendant's "tortious conduct results in a substantial in-
vasion of a legally protected interest," a standard often repeated. 29
While allowing emotional distress damages in various types of
cases without physical injury, Montana purports to disallow emo-
tional distress damages in claims involving only property damage3"
or contract claims.' Also, in what was described as a "mid-course
correction," the court severely curtailed the recoverability of tort
damages in breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing
cases." The Montana Legislature has also eliminated the availabil-
ity of emotional distress damages in wrongful discharge cases.3"
The preceding review of Montana cases considers only cases in
29. Id. at 473, 686 P.2d at 213. See also Shupak v. New York Life Ins. Co., 780 F.
Supp. 1328 (D. Mont. 1991); Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F.
Supp. 1339 (D. Mont. 1991); Semenza v. Leitzke, 232 Mont. 15, 754 P.2d 509 (1988); McGre-
gor v. Mommer, 220 Mont. 98, 714 P.2d 536 (1986).
30. Day, at 195, 789 P.2d at 1224. In Day, the Montana Power Company negligently
ruptured a gas service line resulting in a fire and explosion that destroyed the Day's restau-
rant. The jury awarded $450,000 in emotional distress damages to the owner of the restau-
rant. Id. at 196-97, 789 P.2d at 1225.
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the emotional distress award and stated that in
emotional distress cases absent physical injury the question is "[wihether tortious conduct
results in a substantial invasion of a legally protected interest and causes a significant im-
pact upon the person of plaintiff." Id. at 198-99, 789 P.2d at 1226 (citing Johnson v. Super-
save Markets, Inc., 211 Mont. 465, 473, 686 P,2d 209, 213 (1984)) (emphasis in original). The
court refused to extend recovery for emotional distress damages to instances where the de-
fendant negligently damages or destroys real property and there is no physical injury, based
.on the lack of substantial invasion of a legally protected interest. Day, at 199-200, 789 P.2d
at 1227.
But see French, at 327, 661 P.2d at 844, and Harrington, at 37, 575 P.2d at 578, in
which emotional distress damages were awarded for property damage claims. However, both
cases involved personal injury of varying degrees. Further, while courts generally refuse to
allow emotional distress.damages in purely property damage cases, private nuisance cases
like French are a different type of case and emotional distress damages are allowed.
31. Larson v. Undem, 246 Mont. 336, 805 P.2d 1318 (1990). But see Zugg, at 292, 779
P.2d at 913; Dunfee, at 447, 720 P.2d at 1148; McGregor, at 98, 714 P.2d at 536. The court
in Larson held that the evidence did "not show that in the ordinary course of things, emo-
tional distress damages were likely to result from the defendant's breach of contract." Lar-
son, at 342, 805 P.2d at 1322. The court further concluded "that the evidence presented fails
to establish that the emotional distress damages were clearly ascertainable in origin." Id.
Note, however, that the court in Zugg allowed recovery for emotional distress damages
for fraud arising out of a contract. Zugg, at 292, 779 P.2d at 913.
32. Story v. City of Bozeman, 242 Mont. 436, 791 P.2d 767 (1990). In Story the Mon-
tana Supreme Court concluded that "in the great majority of ordinary contract cases, a
breach of the covenant is only a breach of the contract and only contract damages are due."
Id. at 450, 791 P.2d at 775. However, the court went on to state that "[t]he tort of bad faith
may still apply in exceptional circumstances." Id. at 451, 791 P.2d at 776.
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(3) (1991) states that "[tihere is no right under any
legal theory to damages for wrongful discharge under this part for pain and suffering, emo-
tional distress, compensatory damages, punitive damages, or any other form of damages,
except as provided in subsections (1) and (2)." (Emphasis added).
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which emotional distress is considered an element of damages. To
complete the review of Montana cases, the next section addresses
emotional distress as a cause of action; that is, claims of either neg-
ligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
C. Emotional Distress as a Cause of Action
Skepticism of emotional distress claims has deep and powerful
roots. In Lynch v. Knight,"4 Lord Wensleydale wrote the often-
cited phrase: "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and
does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of
causes that alone.""5 Thus, a distinction developed, and remains,
between those cases in which mental or emotional distress alone is
the subject of the action, and in which the emotional distress is
said to be "parasitic," i.e., connected to or a consequence of other
injury, particularly physical injury. 6 Because of "the fear of ficti-
tious or trivial claims, distrust of the proof offered, and the diffi-
culty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries to liability, the law
has been slow to afford independent protection to the interest in
freedom from emotional distress standing alone. '37 It is only re-
cently that infliction of emotional distress has been recognized as a
separate and distinct cause of action, absent the elements of an-
other tort such as assault, battery, trespass or false
imprisonment. 3
Therefore, it is understandable that Montana is reluctant to
extend remedies for emotional distress alone, whether for negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED) or intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED).39 The Montana Supreme Court has not
rejected the potential validity of a cause of action for IIED, but it
has yet to find a case that merits its recognition as a separate cause
of action.4 ° The Montana Supreme Court has, however, allowed
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.4" Both types of
claims are discussed below.
34. 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L. 1861).
35. Id.; cited, among many others, by Magruder and Speiser. See supra, note 5.
36. SPEISER, supra note 5, at 943-44.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. b (1965).
38. Id.
39. See Day, at 199-200, 789 P.2d at 1227 and cases cited therein; see also Marazzato
v. Burlington N. R.R., 249 Mont. 487, 817 P.2d 672 (1991) (Trieweiler, J., concurring).
40. See Doohan v. Bigfork Sch. Dist. No. 38, 247 Mont. 125, 138, 805 P.2d 1354, 1362
(1991).
41. See Versland, 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583 and Johnson, 211 Mont. 465, 686 P.2d
[Vol. 53
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1. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
"Early courts denied recovery for damage for emotional
trauma if there was no physical impact . . 42 Later, this rule was
replaced with one that limited recovery to plaintiffs who suffered
distress as a consequence of fear for their own physical
safety-plaintiffs located in the 'zone of danger.'4 3 In 1968, the
California Supreme Court abandoned the "zone of danger" rule
and adopted the "zone of psychic-danger" rule."" In Dillon v. Legg,
the California court allowed recovery by a mother for emotional
trauma she suffered by witnessing her daughter's death at the
hands of a motorist as the daughter crossed a street. The Califor-
nia court found that it was reasonably foreseeable that negligent
operation of a motor vehicle that causes injury to a child will cause
mental distress to a parent who witnesses the accident.4 5 The Dil-
lon court required some physical manifestation of the emotional
distress, though this requirement was later abandoned. 46
a. Montana Takes the First Step: Versland v. Caron
Transport
The Montana Supreme Court first confronted the issue of
emotional distress as a separate cause of action in Versland v.
Caron Transport in 1983. 41 In Versland, the court adopted the
California ."zone of psychic-danger rule" and found that "in light
of today's more advanced state of medical science, technology and
testing techniques, the traditional limitation of requiring the exis-
tence of physical injury as a condition precedent to recovery for
psychic injury is no longer necessary. '48 The court stated that
"[w]hile physical manifestations of emotional trauma may be con-
sidered by the trier of fact along with other evidence, physical
manifestation will not be required to support a prima facie case
for negligent infliction of emotional distress." '49
Under the Versland rule, still in effect today, three elements
42. Versland, at 316, 671 P.2d at 585.
43. -[U]nder this rule, a plaintiff could recover if he were located within the zone of
defendant's negligent conduct and feared for his own safety." Versland, at 316, 671 P.2d at
585. See also Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAW. L. RE:v. 1 (1979).
44. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). This aspect of Dillon has been clarified
and narrowed. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989).
45. Dillon, at 920-21.
46. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
47. Versland v. Caron Transp., 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583 (1983).
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are required to establish liability for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress:
(1)The shock must result from a direct emotional impact upon
the plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous perception of
the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence.
(2)The plaintiff and victim must be closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a dis-
tant relationship.
(3)Either death or serious physical injury of the victim must have
occurred as a result of the defendant's negligence. 50
Thus, while recognizing the need to address emotional distress
claims cautiously, the Montana court allowed a plaintiff who had
suffered no physical injury to recover damages for purely emo-
tional and mental harm, although under carefully limited circum-
stances. Although not squarely articulated, the cautious approach
to pure emotional distress claims was based on underlying con-
cerns about the genuineness of such claims and the effect on the
tort system of unlimited liability to anyone remotely affected by
the defendant's negligence.
b. The Next Step: Johnson v. Supersave Markets
A year after Versland, the Montana Supreme Court took a gi-
ant step in the area of emotional distress claims and, for the first
time, allowed the direct victim of purely negligent acts to recover
for emotional distress alone in the absence of physical harm, thus
explicitly creating a cause of action for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress (NIED). The careful analysis that characterized
Versland was missing. There was no consideration of the policy
concerns that typically restrain courts considering emotional dis-
tress claims in the absence of physical injury. The facts and hold-
ing of that case deserve critical scrutiny.
Johnson brought an action for intentional unlawful arrest and,
alternatively, claims for negligence and punitive damages arising
out of his wrongful arrest caused by defendant's failure to properly
confirm restitution of a prior non-sufficient funds check.5" Johnson
was held a short time in jail, then released.52 His divorce lawyer,
50. Id. For a thorough discussion, see Francis X. Clinch and Jodie L. Johnson, Note,
Compensation of Emotional Distress in Montana: Distinctions Between Bystanders and
Victims, 47 MONT. L. REV. 479 (1986). The authors of that article appear to favor an expan-
sion of recovery for emotional distress alone, a conclusion we regard as unsound.
51. Johnson, at 467, 686 P.2d at 210 (1984).
52. Id. at 469, 686 P.2d at 211.
[Vol. 53
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whom Johnson called for assistance, testified that the plaintiff was
very "animated" and nervous while in jail, and was "disoriented"
and "on the verge of tears.""3
At the close of plaintiff's case, the trial court dismissed both
the intentional tort claim and the claim for punitive damages.54
The case went to the jury solely as a claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress.5 The jury awarded $17,000, subject to a fif-
teen percent reduction for comparative negligence.5
In upholding the verdict, the supreme court found support for
the award of emotional distress damages from cases that allow
such damages when the defendant's conduct is intentional or out-
rageous. It also, remarkably, found support in an Oregon Court of
Appeals decision, Meyer v. 4-D Insulation Co.,58 although that
court had refused to allow recovery of emotional distress damages
resulting from negligent damage to property. 9 The Meyer court,
noting that most emotional distress damage recoveries are limited
to intentional torts, expressed a hesitancy to allow recovery for
mental distress claims "absent some indication that they are real
and not feigned." 60
Notwithstanding the limitations expressed in Meyer, the
Johnson court relied on it to "adopt the species of case approach
which requires a factual analysis of each case to determine whether
the alleged 'emotional distress' merits compensation."'" As guid-
ance for making that determination, the court established the fol-
lowing "standard": "[W]e will look to whether tortious conduct re-
sults in a substantial invasion of a legally protected interest and
causes a significant impact upon the person of the plaintiff. 62
With that brief statement, a new tort-with an unprecedented
standard-was born in Montana.
One of the truly amazing things about the creation of the
"standard" for negligent infliction cases in Montana in Johnson is
the court's failure to cite or discuss the standard adopted in the
53. Id. at 474, 686 P.2d at 213-14.
54. Id. at 476, 686 P.2d at 215 (citing Owens v. Parker Drilling Co., 207 Mont. 446, 676
P.2d 162 (1984)). In Johnson the trial court held, and the supreme court agreed, that there
was not sufficient evidence of reckless conduct to meet the "implied malice" standard neces-
sary to support a punitive damages claim. Johnson, at 476, 686 P.2d at 215.
55. Johnson, at 468, 686 P.2d at 210.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 471-73, 686 P.2d at 212-13.
58. 652 P.2d 852 (Or. App. 1982).
59. Johnson, at 472-73, 686 P.2d at 213.
60. Id. at 473, 686 P.2d at 213 (quoting Meyer, 652 P.2d at 857).
61. Id. at 473, 686 P.2d at 213.
62. Id. (emphasis in original).
1992]
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Restatement,63 nor, indeed, to consider the majority rule in Ameri-
can courts: that emotional distress alone, without physical harm, is
left uncompensated .6 Section 436A of the Restatement provides:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk
of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to an-
other, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without
bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable
for such emotional disturbance.6
Johnson, of course, involved no risk of bodily harm and the
claims presented were for purely emotional disturbance. Had the
court adopted the Restatement rule, it would have denied recov-
ery. It is also important to note that the court specifically refused
to draw a distinction between intentional and negligent conduct,
holding that consideration-of a "defendant's culpability" is a sub-
ject "more properly considered when addressing the subject of pu-
nitive damages.' '66
Finally, the Johnson court found that plaintiff's "liberty" in-
terest was invaded when he was arrested, handcuffed, frisked,
booked and charged, and that this liberty interest was "legally pro-
tected." 7 The emotional impact described by Johnson's lawyer
was apparently sufficient to satisfy the "significant impact"
requirement.
The Johnson case is routinely cited in Montana 8 and its
"standard" quoted in nearly all cases of claimed emotional dis-
tress. Unfortunately, it is a "standard" under which virtually any
facts may be sufficient to establish liability. Yet questions abound.
How much of an "invasion" is necessary before it is regarded as
"substantial"? What is a "legally protected interest"? 9 How much
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965).
64. Id.
65. Id. In comment b to Section 436A, the authors cite the traditional and often-re-
peated reasons for the rule: (1) emotional disturbance is normally trivial and temporary and
compensating emotional distress under these circumstances would constitute a burden on
the courts, (2) in the absence of the guarantee of genuineness provided by resulting bodily
harm, emotional disturbance can be "too easily feigned," and allowing such recovery would
"open too wide a door for false claimants who have suffered no real harm" and, (3) where
the defendant has been merely negligent, with no intent to do harm, his fault is not suffi-
ciently great as to require him to pay for purely mental disturbance.
66. Johnson, at 472, 686 P.2d at 213.
67. Id. at 473, 686 P.2d at 213.
68. See supra note 29.
69. In First Bank (N.A.) - Billings v. Clark, 236 Mont. 195, 771 P.2d 84 (1989), the
Montana Supreme Court stated that the legally protected interest is the right to be free
from emotional distress. Id. at 206, 771 P.2d at 91. Thus, the mere allegation of emotional
distress satisfies the test and the definition becomes perfectly circular.
[Vol. 53
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of an impact on the "person of the plaintiff" is regarded as "signifi-
cant," and "significant" to whom? Once an independent interest in
freedom from negligently inflicted mental distress is recognized,
there is no logical stopping place."0
Another major flaw in Johnson is the court's refusal to con-
sider the culpability of the defendant's conduct.7" While appropri-
ately noting that most courts allow emotional distress damages for
intentional or outrageous conduct, the court failed to understand
the distinction between those cases and claims for emotional dis-
tress from negligent conduct. The distinction is based on concerns
over imagined or fraudulent claims. When the defendant's conduct
is aimed at a specific person and is intentional, it is more likely
that it is intended to harm and will have the intended effect. There
is, under those circumstances, a more reliable basis for allowing a
claim no one can see or measure to go forward than exists in the
routine negligence case. As Prosser notes in discussing the develop-
ment of the cause of action for infliction of emotional distress:
Its limits are as yet ill defined, but it has been extended to its
greatest length in the case of intentional infliction of emotional
suffering by conduct of a flagrant character, the enormity of
which adds especial weight to the plaintiff's claim, and is in itself
an important guarantee that the mental disturbance which fol-"
lows is serious and not feigned. 72
The Johnson court's casual brushing aside of any of the sound
reasons for drawing distinctions between emotional distress claims
in an intentional tort case and the same claim in a simple negli-
gence case is in error and is completely contrary to the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority.73 Its "standard" for measuring emotional
distress claims is so imprecise as to be useless at best and deliber-
ately result-oriented at worst.7 4 It will serve as a useful standard
only if modified as recommended in Part IV, infra.
70. Miller, supra note 43, at 16.
71. 211 Mont. at 472, 686 P.2d at 213.
72. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 57; see also La Fleur v. Mosher, 325 N.W.2d 314, 317
(Wis. 1982) (noting that in the intentional tort cases, it is the nature of the conduct itself
that guarantees genuineness).
73. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Mass. 1982); Thing v. La Chusa,
771 P.2d 814, 816-17 (Cal. 1989).
74. While the court in Johnson failed to appreciate the crucial role of the defendant's
conduct in imposing liability for emotional distress, it looked precisely to that conduct as a
guarantee of genuineness in Safeco Ins. Co. v. Ellinghouse, 223 Mont. 239, 725 P.2d 217
(1986). In affirming an award of mental distress damages (though reducing it), the court
stated that "an award of mental anguish damages is justified by the evidence ... on the
issue of malice ...." Id. at 254, 725 P.2d at 226.
1992]
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2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In 1986, the Montana Supreme Court first confronted the is-
sue of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate
cause of action in Proto v. Elliot.75 In that case the court side-
stepped explicit recognition of a separate IIED cause of action.
The court, in effect, "piggy-backed" IIED onto the existing John-
son standard for NIED and added the requirement that the dis-
tress be severe in nature.7" This has, in effect, made recovery more
difficult in an intentional infliction case than in a case of negligent
infliction, 77 a result contrary to the rationale behind careful scru-
tiny of emotional distress claims.78
Four years later, the Montana Supreme Court again discussed
the possibility of an independent cause of action for IIED and
quoted the Restatement requirement of conduct "so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly in-
tolerable in a civilized community. '70 The Johnson standard was
not mentioned. True to form, however, the court returned to the
double standard in 1991 in Doohan v. Bigfork School District No.
38.1 However, it is unclear from the court's statement in Doohan
whether the standard now is the Restatement plus Johnson, the
Restatement alone or Johnson alone, because the court found that
75. 222 Mont. 393, 722 P.2d 625 (1986). The district court had awarded $3,489 in dam-
ages for IIED. Id. at 395, 722 P.2d at 626. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court immedi-
ately cited Johnson and the often reiterated standard of "substantial invasion of a legally
protected interest .... Id. at 396, 722 P.2d at 627 (emphasis in original). The court did this
even though the cause of action at issue was intentional infliction of emotional distress, not
negligent infliction of emotional distress which was the cause of action in Johnson.
76. The court stated that "[i]n addition, to sustain an action for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the authorities are in accord that the mental or emotional distress
must be of a severe nature." Id. at 627 (citing W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 11 at 51 (3d. ed. 1964)). The court in stressing the term "severe"
stated that the district court found "that Proto had intentionally 'inflicted serious emotional
distress and anguish upon' Stinger." Proto, at 396-97, 722 P.2d at 627. The high court
respected that finding, "although the denomination of the emotional distress as 'serious'
may not equate with 'severe'." Id. at 397, 722 P.2d at 627.
77. The Montana Supreme Court later reiterated the substantial invasion of a legally
protected interest plus severe emotional distress "test" of Proto in Frigon v. Morrison-
Maierle, Inc., 233 Mont. 113, 123-24, 760 P.2d 57, 64 (1988).
78. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. The expressed and accepted ration-
ale for more ready acceptance of claims for emotional harm in cases of intentional conduct
is that "the defendant's conduct often afforded greater proof of a serious invasion of the
victim's mental tranquility than did the presence or absence of resulting physical symp-
toms." Thing, 771 P.2d at 817.
79. Lachenmaier v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 246 Mont. 26, 35, 803 P.2d 614, 619 (1990).
80. Id.
81. 247 Mont. 125, 144, 805 P.2d 1354, 1366 (1991).
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 53 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss2/2
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
the claimant failed to present facts satisfying any standard. s2
3. Montana Law: A Summary
The Montana court is finally beginning to analyze emotional
distress, whether as an element of damages or as a stand-alone
claim, and to recognize limitations. Day v. Montana Power Co.,
which involved a negligence claim for property damage alone, indi-
cates that a majority of the present court is unwilling to open wide
the "floodgates" of litigation that would result if every negligent
act of potential defendants carried with it liability for whatever
emotional harm may result." The Montana court has set high
standards for the not-yet recognized IIED cause of action and
claims to have "narrowly construed" NIED."4 The approach of the
court in both areas is sound, in accordance with the majority of
courts in the United States, and should be continued. Continued
application of Johnson however, is inconsistent with this analytical
approach. Johnson must, therefore, be modified or abandoned.
As noted in more detail in Part III, Section B2, infra, the
same cautious standards applied by the Montana Supreme Court
in IIED cases should also be applied to emotional distress claims
resulting from negligent conduct where no physical injury or im-
mediate threat of physical harm exists. Claims for NIED must be
subject to at least the same proof standard as the Montana court
has applied to claims of IIED.
With the above review of the Montana cases as background,
the article now considers the standards that should apply to claims
of emotional distress connected with the risk and fear of future
disease.
82. Id. Note that Justice Weber dissented in this case, stating that the plaintiff
"presented a compelling factual case in support of his claims," and that the "record sup-
ports the court's action in submitting the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress
to the jury, because the evidence of the defendants' acts reached the threshold level of 'out-
rageousness.' " Id. at 145, 805 P.2d at 1367 (Weber, J., dissenting). Justice Weber appears to
properly apply the single standard from the RESTATEMENT, without the confusing and un-
necessary overlay of Johnson.
83. Justice Harrison points out in his dissent that the holding in Day is contrary to
French v. Moore and that the facts easily meet the "substantial invasion" and "significant
impact" test of Johnson. Actually, French is quite different because there was significant
personal injury and physical impact involved. In addition, French was a "nuisance" case,
and the majority of courts recognize nuisance cases as an exception to the general rule re-
quiring physical harm to support an emotional distress claim. Cf., SPEISER, § 16.3, at 959-60.
As to Justice Harrison's observation that the facts meet the. Johnson standard, he is correct,
demonstrating the weakness of that vague and imprecise standard.
84. See Doohan v. Bigfork Sch. Dist. No. 38, 247 Mont. 125, 138-39, 805 P.2d 1354,




Cox and Shott: Boldly into the Fog
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1992
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
III. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS IN THE "PHOBIA" CASE
This portion of the article is directed to an area not yet ad-
dressed in Montana law: claims for fear of future disease due to
past exposures to toxic substances. 5 Although mental and emo-
tional distress over such serious concerns is easily understood, the
cases present such a bewildering array of factual circumstances
that consistent analysis is often thwarted. The goal of this section
is to review those cases and draw from them principles that Mon-
tana courts should apply to such claims as they arise here. The
authors also propose adjustments to Montana law to address these
more difficult issues.
A. The Dichotomy Between Risk Claims and Fear Claims
There is a generally-recognized difference in the case law be-
tween those cases in which a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for
the increased risk of getting a disease such as cancer in the future
(the "risk" claim), and the fear of contracting such a disease in the
future (the "fear" claim). The courts treat the cases separately, ap-
plying more rigid proof requirements to risk claims than to fear
claims. Sometimes, particularly as to the emotional distress dam-
ages sought, the two causes of action overlap. Standards of proof
for both risk and fear claims are discussed below.
B. Legal Standards for Recovery in the Risk Claim
In many cases, most commonly the asbestos exposure cases,
evidence exists that mere exposure to the offending substance cre-
ates an increased risk of contracting cancer in the future. Those
claims present interesting and difficult problems for litigants and
for the courts."6 When a plaintiff has no clinically diagnosable dis-
ease, is that person seeking compensation for something specula-
tive and conjectural or is he or she entitled to present compensa-
tion for a reasonably certain future?8 The answer often depends
on the medical or clinical proof available because the underlying
policy question is, as stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
85. Cf., infra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
86. An interesting example is the case of Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1984),
in which plaintiff developed cancer while her case was on appeal from a summary judgment
order dismissing her claim for damages due to the increased risk of contracting cancer in the
future.
87. For a complete collection of cases dealing with this precise topic, see David C.
Minneman, Annotation, Future Disease or Condition, or Anxiety Relating Thereto, as Ele-
ment of Recovery, 50 A.L.R.4th 13 (1986).
[Vol. 53
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Ayers v. Jackson Township,88 "at what stage in the evolution of a
toxic injury should tort law intercede by requiring the responsible
party to pay damages?"89 The New Jersey Supreme Court in
Mauro v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,90 later noted that the concept
of compensating an individual for the "significant but unquantified
enhanced risk of a future injury, represents a significant departure
from traditional, prevailing legal principles."9
In considering risk of cancer cases, the following standards
have been developed:
1. Present Physical Injury
Prior to presenting evidence of enhanced future risk of cancer
or other disease, the plaintiff must present proof of a clinically de-
monstrable physical injury.9 2 For example, in the area of asbestos
litigation, the mere breathing of asbestos fibers does not necessa-
rily cause harm. 3 On the other hand, many courts hold that
changes in lung tissue visible on x-ray represent sufficient evidence
of physical damage to satisfy the present physical injury
requirement.9 "
2. Reasonable Certainty of Contracting the Disease
A long-held maxim of the common law is that there is no
cause of action for negligence in the absence of a present injury
because the "threat of future harm, not yet realized, is not
enough."9 " That principle has been eroded in the toxic tort area to
allow recovery of damages for future consequences where those
consequences are "reasonably certain" to occur.9
88. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
89. Id. at 298.
90. 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989).
91. Id. at 260.
92. Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 591-92 (5th Cir. 1986); see
also Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) (subclinical
injury not enough to establish a cause of action); Plummer v. Abbott Labs, 568 F. Supp. 920,
922 (D. R.I. 1983) (mere ingestion of DES does not constitute sufficient injury).
93. See generally AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, A Physician's Guide to Asbestos-
Related Diseases, 252 JAMA 2593, 2594 (1984). See also Amendola v. Kansas City S. Ry.
Co., 699 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1988); Schweitzer, 758 F.2d at 942 ("subclinical
injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to constitute the actual loss or dam-
age to a plaintiff's interest required to sustain a cause of action under generally applicable
principles of tort law").
94. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986); Gideon v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985).
95. W. PAGE KEETON. ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165
(5th ed. 1984).
96. See Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
19921
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The reasonable certainty requirement has been nearly uni-
formly applied, both in asbestos litigation and in claims based on
exposure to toxic chemicals. In such cases, the plaintiff must prove
that the prospective disease is at least reasonably probable to oc-
cur. 7 That standard of proof is consistent with existing Montana
law regarding future damages.98
3. Relationship of Physical Injury to Risk of Disease
A third rule or standard in the risk case is the requirement
that the increased risk of disease stem from the same disease pro-
cess as the present illness. 9 In other words, the disease expected to
develop in the future must be related to the physical injury or
physical damage presently clinically detectable.
In summary, where plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the
increased future risk of contracting a serious disease, he or she
must demonstrate a present injury in the form of physical trauma
or the present existence of the disease itself and prove that the risk
of that future disease is greater than fifty percent. Given existing
Montana case law and the near unanimity of the cases in other
jurisdictions, it is reasonable to expect that the Montana courts
would hold the same way.
4. Recovery for Emotional Distress Damages in the Risk Case
Where a plaintiff faces the prospect that he or she will "more
likely than not" develop a serious and debilitating or possibly fatal
disease in the future, the accompanying mental and emotional dis-
tress is easy to understand and appreciate. Thus, in many respects,
allowing recovery for emotional distress in the case where the fu-
ture disease is more likely than not to occur is much the same as
awarding emotional distress damages with an existing physical in-
jury.1"' Where there is proof of existing physical injury and proof
(plaintiffs cancer claim not barred by statute of limitations because when asbestosis was
discovered he could not show an increased risk of future development of cancer); Morrissy v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (Ill. App. 1979) (possibility of developing cancer
because of prenatal exposure to DES not a present injury unless cancer is reasonably certain
to occur). See also Amendola, supra note 93, for a list of courts that have adopted the
"reasonable probability" standard in claims for increased risk of future disease.
97. See discussion in Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., supra note 90, at 264-66, and
cases cited therein.
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-203 (1991); Graham v. Clarks Fork Nat'l Bank, 204
Mont. 141, 631 P.2d 718, 721 (1981).
99. See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (D. Mass. 1986).
100. An example is found in the asbestos cases. A presence of asbestosis, or even of
parenchymal changes in the lung visible on x-ray, allows a finding of physical injury. See
[Vol. 53
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that future disease is likely to occur, an accompanying emotional
distress claim for the fear of that future disease should find no im-
pediments in Montana law.1°'
C. Recovery in the Fear Claim
Where there is only exposure to a harmful substance, and
neither proof of physical injury nor the likelihood of future disease,
may the plaintiff recover damages for emotional distress or for fear
of what may happen in the future? That question is far more diffi-
cult. The case law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and fact
pattern to fact pattern. This section discusses the more appropri-
ate proof requirements and fits them to what Montana law appears
to be or should be when the questions arise here.
As previously noted, there is little question regarding the right
of a plaintiff who has sustained actual physical injury from expo-
sure to toxic substances to recover damages for emotional distress,
including the reasonable distress over enhanced risk of disease in
the future." 2 Where there is mere exposure, however, and no spe-
cific physical injury, there is no clear rule on whether the plaintiff
may recover damages for the emotional distress of worrying about
the consequences of that particular exposure.' The available
proof often determines whether the case is treated the same as a
physical injury claim with an emotional distress component (emo-
tional distress as an element of damage) or as an independent
cause of action (negligent infliction of emotional distress). It is es-
sential to treat the two separately.' 4
supra note 93. That becomes the basis for recovery for mental and emotional distress
brought about by the fear of cancer in the future, a known risk of asbestos exposure. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying
Mississippi law).
101. See Gurnsey v. Conklin Co., Inc., 230 Mont. 42, 53, 751 P.2d 151, 157 (1988),
(holding that the Johnson v. Supersave instruction is required as a prerequisite for recovery
of emotional distress damages where there "has been no proof of physical or mental injury
to the plaintiff") The corollary is that where there is proof of physical injury, the separate
requirements of Johnson need not be satisfied and damages for mental distress are simply
part of the damages appropriately recoverable.
102. See Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., supra note 90, at 263, citing Devlin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. 1985).
103. An interesting example is Devlin, 495 A.2d at 500 "in which the proof was insuffi-
cient to allow a claim for increased risk of cancer" but was sufficient to support a claim for
fear of cancer. The general consensus, however, appears to be that absent actual physical
harm, resulting emotional distress due to worries about the future is not compensable. Cf.,
Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1986); Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755
F. Supp. 1344, 1371 (S.D. W. Va. 1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1991); DeStories v. City
of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705, 709 (Ariz. App. 1987).
104. The authors believe that this distinction should remain in Montana law but must
1992]
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Because of the underlying concerns militating against simply
allowing any and all claims for emotional distress arising from any
tortious act,' 5 many courts have tried to impose requirements on
emotional distress claims to insure that only genuine claims reach
the jury. One of the leading cases is Payton v. Abbott Labs, a case
involving DES, in which the court denied recovery for fear of can-
cer absent physical harm.'0 6 That case, and the policy reasons ar-
ticulated therein, continues to influence other court decisions in
this area, and appropriately so. The primary means for insuring
genuineness is to require an underlying physical injury. People are
more apt to accept the existence of emotional harm when there is a
visible sign of physical injury.10 7 Unfortunately, once courts elimi-
nate the requirement for present physical injury, a consistent stan-
dard for damages cannot be found.'08
In Montana, however, there are cases in which plaintiffs suf-
fered no physical injuries but, for policy reasons, the court deemed
it appropriate to award damages for emotional distress. The clear-
est Montana example is Versland v. Caron Transport.0 9 In Ver-
sland, the court laid down specific requirements for recovery of
damages for emotional distress suffered as a result of witnessing
serious injury or death to a family member."0 The Montana Su-
preme Court has consistently refused to expand that type of by-
stander liability."' Yet the court has, since Johnson v. Supersave
Markets, Inc.,1 2 allowed recovery for emotional distress absent
go forward with something other than the standard of Johnson. The Johnson standard does
nothing to screen out the types of emotional distress claims that give rise to often-expressed
concerns of fraudulent claims, overburdened courts and unlimited liability.
105. I.e., legitimacy of claims, opening floodgates of litigation, unlimited liability, and
the tendency to believe that mental distress is not as "real" as physical injuries. See gener-
ally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965); Stuart M. Speiser, 4 THE AMER-
ICAN LAW OF TORTS § 16:1 at 937 (1987). See Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 723 F. Supp.
1073, 1090 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828-29 (Cal. 1989).
106. 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
107. Major Keith J. Klein, Fear of Cancer - A Legitimate Claim in Toxic Tort Cases?
33 AFL. REV. 193, 200 (1990) (citing Willmore, In Fear of Cancerphobia, 2 Toxics L. REP.
(BNA) 559 (Sept. 29, 1988)).
108. Albert H. Parnell et al., Medical Monitoring: A Dangerous Trend, FOR THE DE-
FENSE, April, 1992, at 11.
109. 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583 (1983).
110. Id. at 319-20; 671 P.2d at 586-87.
111. Cf., Day v. Montana Power Co., 242 Mont. 195, 198, 789 P.2d 1224, 1226 (1990),
(in which the court stated that it has "narrowly construed the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress"); Marazzato v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 249 Mont. 487, 493, 817
P.2d 672, 676 (1991) (Trieweiler, J., concurring, noting that the court has been "reluctant to
extend" the negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action beyond the limited
circumstances of Versland).
112. 211 Mont. 465, 473, 686 P.2d 209, 213 (1984). 18
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physical or mental injury where there is "evidence of substantial
invasion of a legally protected interest which causes a significant
impact upon the person of the plaintiff ....
The Johnson standard lacks sufficient clarity to screen cases
of emotional distress arising from exposure to toxic substances
when there is no evidence of physical injury. Guarantees of genu-
ineness beyond the superficial, circular definitions of Johnson are
required. By way of illustration, one only need ask whether any
exposure to a toxic or potentially toxic substance constitutes a
"substantial" invasion of a "legally protected interest" sufficient to
meet the Johnson test." 4 It is hard to imagine that it would not
be. Any standard automatically satisfied is no standard at all.
The appropriate focus should be the "significant impact" re-
quirement. If that standard is defined as one resulting in "severe
emotional distress," as required for recovery in the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress cases, 1 5 then Johnson need only be
modified, not discarded.
Rather than continue application of the vague and unhelpful
Johnson standard, however, it is better to discard Johnson and
follow more rigorous standards. In a case of no physical injury, the
threshold question is whether any recovery for emotional distress
is possible. Even if recovery is allowed, traditional standards of
foreseeability and the requirement of "severe emotional distress"
must be imposed. The article considers, first, the question of
whether physical injury is a prerequisite to recovery.
1. Physical Injury as a Prerequisite
Courts across the nation that have considered the recover-
ability of damages for emotional distress have struggled with the
question of whether physical injury is a prerequisite to such recov-
ery. A significant majority of those cases require either physical
injury or physical "impact," i.e., some personal contact between
the plaintiff and defendant or between the plaintiff and some force
set in motion by the defendant. One of the best examples is Pay-
ton v. Abbott Labs," 6 in which the Massachusetts court chose to
113. Niles v. Big Sky Eyewear, 236 Mont. 455, 465, 771 P.2d 114, 119 (1989).
114. Johnson, at 473, 686 P.2d at 213. This is particularly so if one accepts the Mon-
tana Supreme Court's later statement that the "legally protected interest" is the right to be
free from emotional distress. See First Bank (N.A.) - Billings v. Clark, 236 Mont. 195, 206,
771 P.2d 84, 91 (1989).
115. Clark, 236 Mont. at 206, 771 P.2d at 91. See also McNeil v. Currie, - Mont.
-, 830 P.2d 1241 (1992).
116. 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
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follow the Restatement rule117 denying recovery for emotional in-
jury alone, in the absence of physical injury. ' After reviewing the
major policy reasons for and against such claims, the court stated:
[W]hen recovery is sought for negligent, rather than intentional
or reckless, infliction of emotional distress, evidence must be in-
troduced that the plaintiff has suffered physical harm. This re-
quirement, like those set forth in Agis, will serve to limit frivolous
suits and those in which only bad manners or mere hurt feelings
are involved, and will provide a reasonable safeguard against false
claims." 9
One of the most thoroughly-developed areas of the law regard-
ing emotional distress absent physical injury is claims under the
Federal Employers Liability Act (hereinafter FELA). 12 ° In those
cases, the general rule is that there is no right of recovery absent
physical injury or threat of physical harm.'2' The courts in FELA
cases are particularly concerned, partially due to FELA's feather-
weight liability standards,'22 about opening the floodgates of litiga-
tion, encouraging fraudulent claims and allowing claims with incal-
culable and potentially unlimited damages.'23 Thus, the general
rule is that absent physical injury or the threat of physical harm,
there can be no recovery for emotional distress damages under
FELA. 12
4
Montana cases have not discussed or confronted the explicit
policy choice discussed so thoroughly in cases such as Payton v.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965).
118. Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 174.
119. Id. at 180.
120. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
121. Marazzato v. Burlington N. R.R., 249 Mont. 487, 817 P.2d 672 (1991) (Trieweiler,
J., concurring). Justice Trieweiler, who had extensive FELA experience prior to coming to
the bench, noted that this is the majority rule. Justice Trieweiler also noted that there has
been no federal decisional law since the Ninth Circuit decision of Buell v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 771 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1985), later reversed in Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987), which "clearly allows recovery for the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress absent infliction of physical harm to the plaintiff."
Marazzato, 249 Mont. at 493, 817 P.2d at 676 (Trieweiler, J., concurring).
122. A defendant is liable under FELA for all of plaintiff's damages when the defend-
ant's negligence caused, in whole or in part, the injury. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
123. See, e.g., Outten v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1991);
Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1073, 1090 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
124. See Ray v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 914 (1992); Outten, 928 F.2d 74; Kraus, 723 F. Supp. 1073. One Montana district
court has refused to allow a FELA claim seeking damages for emotional distress. Polich v.
Burlington N. R.R., No. ADV-88-1319 (Mont. Dist. Ct., Cascade County, July 31, 1990)
(opinion on file with the authors). But see Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 937 F.2d 1004, 1009
(5th Cir. 1991), rehearing en banc granted, 954 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1992).
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Abbott Labs.'2 5 Instead, once the Montana Supreme Court crossed
the threshold in Versland, 26 it abandoned the physical injury re-
quirement without discussion in Johnson and has followed John-
son since.' 27 The court would be on more solid analytical ground
had it recognized Versland as an exception, well supported in the
law, and adhered to a physical injury requirement in emotional
distress cases. Perhaps the case will come along where the court
will be required to consider the policy ramifications of its apparent
rejection of the physical injury requirement in emotional distress
claims.
It seems unlikely that the Montana Supreme Court will now
reject its earlier decisions and adopt the rule of section 436A of the
Restatement or the rules so thoroughly developed in FELA cases.
That is unfortunate. The concerns regarding emotional distress
claims, particularly in the area of exposure to substances that may
cause harm in the future and which are not likely to cause injury,
are still very real. Because of these concerns, and absent a physical
injury requirement, there must be significant limitations placed
upon such cases. If not, anyone who has ever sprayed weeds with
2,4-D, worked around asbestos, smoked cigarettes or lived near
powerlines would have a potential claim for fear of contracting
cancer in the future. The remaining sections of this article discuss
appropriate limitations that will guard against these problems yet
still allow compensation for legitimate claims of serious emotional
distress when physical injury is absent or trivial.
2. Limitations in Cases Not Involving Physical Injury
The courts struggle with this issue each time they consider a
claim for emotional distress absent physical injury. The only de-
serving claims are those that are "genuine." Yet, how is genuine-
ness to be determined? The question cannot be turned over to a
jury in each instance with the simple direction to "be fair." "In
order to avoid limitless liability out of all proportion to the degree
of a defendant's negligence .... the right to recover for negligently
caused emotional distress must be limited."' 28 The following guide-
lines, applied in other cases, should be applied in Montana law as
well.
125. 437 N.E.2d at 178-80.
126. Versland, 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583.
127. See Niles, at 465, 771 P.2d at 119; Stensvad v. Towe, 232 Mont. 378, 386, 759
P.2d 138, 143 (1988); Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 227 Mont. 329, 335, 740 P.2d 631, 635
(1987); Tynes v. Bankers Life Co., 224 Mont. 350, 369, 730 P.2d 1115, 1127 (1986).
128. Thing, at 826-27.
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a. Serious Emotional Distress Must Be Foreseeable
Courts and commentators have focused on foreseeability as a
means of limiting liability. Simply put, the standard requires that
serious distress to a normal individual be foreseeable as a matter of
proximate cause.129 Use of that test accomplishes two purposes.
First, it is an objective test focusing on the "normal" person,
thereby eliminating the "thin skull" rule in the area of emotional
distress claims. Second, it brings an end point to unlimited liability
by giving a traditional tort law tool to judges that can be used to
weed out claims in which consequences are too remote to be re-
garded as foreseeable. 130
b. Proof Must Go Beyond the Trivial
Proof must go beyond the ordinary worries about the future
course of one's life. Many courts have held that emotional distress
due to fear of the future must be serious, medically diagnosable
and medically significant, or manifested by objective symptomatol-
ogy.1 31 When a plaintiff seeks to recover for fear of cancer, he or
she must present specific evidence of fear of that condition.
1 32
c. The Emotional Distress Must Be Reasonable
It is not enough for a plaintiff to simply state that he or she
fears future harm. It must be "reasonable" that he or she has such
fears. The reasonableness of the distress is judged by an objective
standard. 33 This makes sense, for it may not be reasonable that a
plaintiff, even though having demonstrably severe or even clini-
cally diagnosable emotional distress, has such a reaction to a risk
of cancer increased from, for example, 1 in 1,000,000 to 1 in
500,000. The risk is remote in either case. A trial judge should have
the ability to rule that the fears in such a case are not objectively
"reasonable," and put an end to a frivolous case.
129. Garcia v. Williams, 704 F. Supp. 984, 1004 (N:D. Cal. 1988); Leong v. Takasaki,
520 P.2d 758, 765 (Haw. 1974); Douglas B. Marlowe, Negligent Infliction of Mental Dis-
tress: A Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an
Analysis of Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REV. 781, 824
(1988).
130. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1568 (D. Haw. 1990);
Marlowe, supra note 129, at 824-29. The Montana Supreme Court has upheld summary
judgment granted on foreseeability grounds. Cf., Marazzato, at 487, 817 P.2d at 672.
131. Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 866-67 (Mo. App. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986); Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 181.
132. Smith v. A.C. & S., Inc., 843 F.2d 854, 859 (5th Cir. 1988); Hawaii Federal Asbes-
tos Cases, 734 F. Supp. at 1569.
133. See, e.g., Farrall v. A.C. & S. Co., 558 A.2d 1078, 1081 (Del. Super. 1989).
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d. The Emotional Distress Must Be "Severe"
The most important limitation, one with roots in Montana
law, limits recovery to cases of "severe emotional distress."134 Some
courts require that the distress be medically significant or, at least,
manifested by objective symptoms.'3 5 As demonstrated by Johnson
v. Supersave, Inc., there has been no such requirement in
Montana.'
The problems that arise from a lack of a higher standard of
proof for pure emotional distress claims are demonstrated by Zugg
v. Ramage,"7 where the court affirmed an award that included
damages for emotional distress based on one plaintiff's testimony
that he had been to a doctor for chest pains, was worried over fi-
nancial problems, and suffered many sleepless nights.1 38 A second
plaintiff testified that he had been forced to borrow money, was
cranky and had lost sleep. ' 39 The court noted that the "amount of
evidence of emotional distress is close to the line in this case," but
sufficient to support the award.'40 Unfortunately, the court did not
describe where the line was, only that the evidence was "close" to
it. Thus, trial courts and practitioners were left by Zugg with no
measuring stick by which to determine whether the emotional dis-
tress was of a significantly serious nature to obtain protection
under the law. The line not articulated in Zugg must be drawn to
control the proliferation of trivial emotional distress cases.
The appropriate line has already been drawn in the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress cases, and should simply be
applied to cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
standard originates in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46
comment j (1965), adopted by the court in First Bank (N.A.) -
Billings v. Clark."" In that case, the court considered the Johnson
standard and held that the requirement of a "significant impact
indicates that the emotional distress suffered by the victim must
be severe.1' 42 The Restatement comment adopted by the court
134. First Bank (N.A.) - Billings v. Clark at 206, 771 P.2d at 91.
135. Bennett, 698 S.W.2d at 867.
136. 211 Mont. at 473-74, 686 P.2d at 213-14. Johnson's lawyer, who saw him in jail,
described him as "agitated," "disoriented," not understanding why he was there, "more
animated," and he had a "lot more hand movement, expressions, pacing and nervousness"
which was "very apparent." Time spent in jail was very short. Id. at 469, 686 P.2d at 211.
137. 239 Mont. 292, 779 P.2d 913 (1989).
138. Id. at 298, 779 P.2d at 917.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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states that only "extreme" emotional distress is compensable and
that the "law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so se-
vere that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it."" 3
It is an aberration, and reflective of a lack of analysis, that the
standard for proof of harm in Montana in an intentional infliction
case is more demanding than in a negligent infliction case. There is
no rational reason for the difference. If anything, the standard of
proof should be more strict in a negligence case than in a case of
intentional harm because of the historical distrust of emotional
distress claims and concern over genuineness. Where deliberate
conduct is directed at a particular individual, it is more likely that
the conduct will have its intended result, i.e., emotional anguish on
the part of the victim," 4 and it is sound public policy to require
the intentional tortfeasor to pay damages for all harm inflicted.
Concerns regarding foreseeability of harm are diminished in the
intentional tort case." 5
When the emotional distress requirements in both intentional
and negligent infliction cases are held to the same standard, liti-
gants, lawyers and judges are better served. When the threshold
requirement is "severe emotional distress" as defined in First
Bank (N.A.) - Billings v. Clark," " the "floodgates of litigation" will
remain closed, or at least in check, and we will not have taken an-
other step to the "eggshell society" referred to by the court in
cases from Johnson to Doohan.
IV. MODIFICATIONS IN MONTANA LAW
As discussed earlier, the Johnson v. Supersave, Inc. standard
of liability for emotional harm is too vague, circular and amor-
phous to be of any value. The Montana Supreme Court should fol-
low the Restatement rule and impose a physical injury require-
ment. Absent that step, the court should reject the Johnson
standard and replace it with the Restatement standard adopted in
Clark. The third, though least desirable, alternative is to modify
Johnson by grafting on the Restatement standard so as to define
the term "substantial impact." This would make it clear to trial
judges and juries that only emotional distress "so severe no reason-
able person could be expected to endure it," can be compensated
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
145. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d at 818-21 (regarding foreseeability and the limi-
tations of that rule).
146. 236 Mont. at 206, 771 P.2d at 91.
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in a claim for purely emotional injuries.'4 7 That standard is the one
applied in many cases, and is a rational and logical approach. '"" A
severe emotional distress requirement adheres to a consistent legal
standard of recovery and avoids the dilemma of either denying re-
covery for all forms of mental distress or compensating any and all
trivial injuries. The standard is objective, involving the "reasonable
man, normally constituted."' 49
The standard applied can then be given to the jury by way of
the following jury instruction:
Plaintiff claims damages from emotional distress suffered as a
consequence of the alleged negligence of the defendant. Damages
may be awarded by you only if the defendant's conduct has
caused a significant impact upon the plaintiff and has resulted in
emotional distress that is so severe that a reasonable person, nor-
mally constituted, could not be expected to endure it.
This instruction should be given in cases of both intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. It retains the only useful
portion of the Johnson standard, and applies a consistent objective
test designed to eliminate trivial claims.
Adoption of the severe emotional distress standard avoids the
commonly expressed concern that allowing any and all manner of
such claims will open the floodgates of litigation and prevent the
courts from weeding out fraudulent claims.
V. CONCLUSION
The business of compensating for injuries to the psyche is dif-
ficult and has resulted in uneven and unpredictable awards. The
Montana decisions reflect these difficulties. Yet the way to a ra-
tional, consistent approach was paved in First Bank (N.A.) Bill-
ings v. Clark, and the Montana Supreme Court's adoption of a "se-
vere emotional distress" requirement in intentional infliction cases.
Extending that requirement to negligent infliction cases and dis-
carding Johnson will serve Montana law well and prepare it for the
oncoming wave of such claims in toxic tort and chemical exposure
cases.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
148. See Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 HAw. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (1979);
Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970).
149. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520.
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